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The oil market
The financial and economic crisis has caused a drop in the oil
demand and the collapse of the barrel price. This decline is
beneficial for the real economy as it halts inflation and the loss of
purchasing power of consumers. However, we must not get used to
current oil prices. Once we exit the recession, we might find a
scenario in which credit restrictions and excessively low prices may
force the oil industry to postpone investment in necessary projects
to adequately secure future supply, which may unleash a new
spectacular price spiral. A «green New Deal» should be fostered to
allow us to overcome the crisis and reduce our dependence on oil.
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In early July 2008, the West Texas Intermediate
(WTI) barrel reached its peak after a steady
rise started in mid 2003, marking an all-time
record $147.27 on the New York market. After
that, it plummeted a staggering 77% within
just seven months, thus reaching roughly
$34 in mid February 2009, the lowest value
since the first quarter of 2004. Since the
beginning of 2009, the WTI index has been
highly volatile, oscillating between $34
and $49, though its average profile has been
 relatively flat.
If we look at the WTI barrel price curve over
the last ten years, we will be able to divide it
into three big portions. The first goes from
1999 to 2003 and is characterised by relatively
stable prices within the $20-25 range. The second
starts in mid 2003, with a spectacular surge
that finds its climax with the July 2008 all-time
record. The third portion reflects the above-
mentioned spectacular fall, which seems to
have halted, however momentarily, in the first
months of 2009, during which there has been
a succession of ups and downs around a $40
per barrel average.
The financial crisis and the economic
recession we are experiencing 
have done away with the speculative
factor (no matter if this is now the
cause or the effect), while there 
has been a notable erosion of
demand, especially in industrialised
countries.
As to the causes of the episode of ongoing
price inflation experienced in the last five
years, from mid 2003 to mid 2008, one of the
most common explanations is the existence
of a speculative bubble. This has been the
 thesis, for instance, of the Organization of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which
sustained summit after summit that the mar-
ket was well served and the price surge was
simply due to speculation. However, both the
International Energy Agency and the US
Department of Energy disagreed. For these
organisations, the high crude prices reflected
the worrying perspective caused by an ever
higher demand and a limited offer, a situation
that was certainly paving the way for speculation.
The relative relevance of this phenomenon
was not denied, but it was argued that specu-
lation was not the cause of the price rise but a
collateral effect of a structural imbalance
between offer and demand.
However, everybody agrees that the crude
price drop that has been taking place since
July 2008 is due to the fact that the financial
crisis and the economic recession we are
experiencing have done away with the specu-
lative factor (no matter if this is now the cause
or the effect), while there has been a notable
erosion of demand, especially in industrialised
countries. The data on the evolution of global
demand provided on a monthly basis by the
International Energy Agency, the United
States Energy Information Administration
and the OPEC clearly show this.
So far the history. But how are oil prices
expected to evolve in the short term?
As to the evolution of demand over 2009,
the forecast of the three above-mentioned
organisations published last March are quite
straightforward. As a consequence of the
 serious decline of the global economic situation,
demand will go on falling for a second con-
secutive year, a situation that had not
occurred since 1982-1983.
For instance, the OPEC, in its Monthly Oil
 Market Report, estimates that global oil demand
declined by 0.32% in 2008, which is equivalent
to 280,000 barrels a day, while the 2009 forecast
shows a reduction by another 1.18%, i.e.
slightly over a million barrels a day. Overall
global demand in 2009 will be at roughly
84.61 million barrels a day, compared to an
average 85.6 million in 2008. To the trust, the
demand reduction in 2009 will be especially
felt in developed OECD countries, where a
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2.74% drop is expected, which amounts to
roughly 1.3 million daily barrels. This reduction
in demand would be partly made up for by a
3.1% (210,000 daily barrels) increase in oil
producing countries in the Middle East. As to
China and other emerging economies, the
OPEC expects a slowdown in the demand
increase but not a net reduction. Particularly
regarding China, OPEC estimates for 2009
indicate a 1.4% (110,000 daily barrels) increase
compared to 2008, which means that the
world’s second largest consumer will use
8.1 million barrels a day in 2009.
In any case, the 2009 demand forecast pub-
lished by the OPEC in March reduced the
 February figures by 430,000 barrels a day and
those published in January by 610,000 daily
barrels, a downward review trend that may be
reinforced in the months to come.
According to the IEA, the demand will
suffer the biggest fall in the OECD
countries.
In fact, the OPEC forecast on demand in 2009
is more optimistic than that of the Interna-
tional Energy Agency (IEA). In its Oil Market
Report, the latter organisation –an advisor in
energy matters to OECD countries, most of
them net oil importers– expects the strongest
fall in worldwide crude demand since 1982
this year. The IEA figures for 2009 show a
drop in global demand of up to 1.3 million
barrels a day, which would result in a daily
demand of roughly 84.4 million barrels, that
is, 210,000 barrels below the OPEC forecast.
According to the IEA, the demand will suffer
the biggest fall in the OECD countries, espe-
cially the European Union and the industri-
alised Pacific countries, where an overall drop
of almost 1.5 million barrels a day is expected.
This decline will partly be compensated by the
increase in demand in non-OECD countries,
set at approximately 500,000 barrels a day. 
The Agency still expects a positive demand
growth in China, Latin America and the
15paradigmes /  Issue no. 2 / June 2009
1Q
 2
00
7
2Q
 2
00
7
3Q
 2
00
7
4Q
 2
00
7
1Q
 2
00
8
2Q
 2
00
8
3Q
 2
00
8
4Q
 2
00
8
1Q
 2
00
9
2Q
 2
00
9
3Q
 2
00
9
4Q
 2
00
9
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
6.6
7.0
7.4
8.0
mb/d
6.8
7.6
7.8
7.2
8.4
8.2
6.4
Graph 1. Quarterly oil demand in China
Source: OECD/IEA: Oil Market Report, February 2009
The OPEC expects the demand in China to
increase by 1.4% in 2009.
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Graph 2. Quarterly oil demand worldwide
Source: OECD/IEA: Oil Market Report, February 2009
The drop in global demand is expected 
to amount to 1.3 million barrels a day 
in 2009.
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 Middle East in 2009. In the case of China, the
expected growth is almost unnoticeable
(25,000 daily barrels) considering the 4.3%,
4.6% and 7.8% rates experienced in 2008,
2007 and 2006 respectively. The IEA further
expects a zero growth in the rest of Asia,
including India, and asserts that only those
regions and countries with highly subsidised
oil prices, as is the case of Latin America and
the Middle East producing countries, can be
expected to have a relatively steady growth in
demand, though at less than half the rate of
the last years.
As was the case of the OPEC projections, the
IEA March report also makes a downward
correction of its global demand estimates pub-
lished in January and February. Put in million
barrels a day, the forecast has declined from
almost 85.3 (January) to 84.7 (February) and
84.3 (March).
Without any doubt, the ongoing dramatic
downward reviews made in the last months
by both producers (OPEC) and consumers
(IEA) clearly show the extreme weakness and
the progressive deterioration of the global
economy and also the slowdown of industrial
activity and consumption. This situation
might become even worse if the most pes-
simistic forecasts come true, which fear the
crisis to spread out to emerging economies
and a net destruction of demand in these
countries.
Given the ongoing drop in consumption
 following economic recession, the aforemen-
tioned bleak prospect for a demand recovery
and the urgent need to halt the fall in crude
prices, the OPEC has reacted by deciding
 several production cuts. Since mid 2008,
 following the breakout of the financial and
 economic crisis, the size of these cuts has led
to a theoretical withdrawal from the market
of 4.2 million barrels a day. This policy has
apparently failed to cause a new rise in oil
prices, but it does seem to have slowed down
their decline, settling at least temporarily at
$35-45.
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Graph 3. Quarterly oil demand in OECD
countries
Source: OECD/IEA: Oil Market Report, February 2009
OECD countries will experience the biggest
drop in demand.
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Graph 4. Quarterly oil demand in non-OECD
countries
Source: OECD/IEA: Oil Market Report, February 2009
The February data expect a certain stability
in demand in non-OECD countries.
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These figures seem clearly insufficient to
secure internal development and stability of
the OPEC countries. A recent report on Saudi
Arabia by the London-based Centre for
Global Energy Studies clearly shows it. The
report concludes that the Kingdom’s finan-
cial and social balance requires a barrel price
at around $62, quite below the $75 men-
tioned by King Abdullah at the Organization
of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries meet-
ing held in Cairo in November 2008, which
however raises the suspicion that most pro-
ducing countries wish a minimum barrel
price within the $60-75 range. If this is the
case, the possibility of further cuts to be
agreed at future OPEC meetings must not be
disregarded.
The oil price decline is the result
of financial and economic
turmoil. Credit restrictions and a
barrel price under marginal
production costs may force the 
oil industry to postpone
investments in necessary projects
to adequately secure future
supply, which may unleash a
new spectacular price spiral.
Nevertheless, in the absence of unexpected
geopolitical troubles, it will be quite difficult to
drive the barrel price to this range in the short
term, even if the OPEC obtained support from
fellow large exporting non-member countries
such as Russia. After all, it must not be forgotten
that in order to meet its goals, the OPEC needs
to keep internal unity and cohesion when
implementing agreed production cuts, which
will not be an easy thing to do in these times
of economic crisis, in which the urgent
search of benefits prevails over compliance
with reduced production quota meaning less
export revenues in the short term. 
The lack of discipline and consistency of some
OPEC members in complying with new
agreed quota has been recently shown by
the International Energy Agency (IEA) and
other international organisations. To complete
this short-term view of oil prices, it is useful
to think about how the situation may develop
in the medium term.
Within a few months, the consuming coun-
tries have gone from an alarm stage activated
by an escalation in global demand and exag-
gerated high oil prices to a relaxation period
in which we have seen the financial and eco-
nomic crisis cause a global reduction in
 consumption and an unprecedented collapse
of the barrel and overall energy prices. There
is no doubt that this drop is beneficial for the
so-called real economy of our countries in
the short term as it controls inflation and the
loss of purchasing power of consumers.
However, this is only one side to it. The
other is that this situation is a time bomb in the
medium term. The oil price decline of the
last months is not the result of successful
demand management nor of a technological
quantum leap allowing an increase in offer, but
of financial and economic turmoil. Once the
storm settles, we might find that credit restric-
tions and a barrel price under marginal pro-
duction costs cause the oil industry to
postpone investments in necessary projects to
adequately secure future supply, which may
unleash a new spectacular price spiral.
The data of the IEA 2008 World Energy Outlook
(WEO) published in November 2008 are
revealing. The IEA believes that due to bleak
economic prospects, we will see a reduction or
stagnation of demand in the next two to three
years, which may result in relatively low crude
prices, although markets will remain volatile.
However, projections assume that the average
barrel price of OECD imports will be at
around $100 in the 2008-2015 period, reaching
a nominal $200 in 2030 (ca. real $120 as of
2007). These figures clearly correct those
assumed in last year’s World Energy Outlook,
which suggested prices at $57.30 in 2015 and
$62 in 2030 (all in real dollars as of 2006).
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What factors led the IEA to double the prices
forecasted in its 2007 report? The difficulties lie
in the offer. The IEA does not see any problems
regarding the availability of oil resources
and reserves, at least in the 2030 horizon.
 Nevertheless, it fears possible refrainment
from investments needed to cover the produc-
tion increase. Over the 2007-2030 period, it is
estimated that only in prospect and produc-
tion, accumulated investment needed to safely
cater for the global increase in oil and gas
demand will amount to $8.4 trillion (as of
2007), which means an average yearly invest-
ment flow of $350 billion. Specifically in the oil
industry, the IEA alerts that reaching the neces-
sary production level for 2007-2030 requires to
implement new extraction capacities of 64 mil-
lion barrels a day, which amounts to six times
the current capacity of Saudi Arabia or a new
Kuwait every year. All this requires a yearly
investment of $274 billion.
The oil industry needs 
to address urgently the issue
of decline experienced in oil fields
in mature areas, many of which
have already passed their
production peak.
Apart from facing a significant increase of
marginal costs related to the use of non-
conventional resources and the development
of projects in ultradeep waters and remote
regions, the oil industry needs to address
urgently the issue of decline experienced in
oil fields in mature areas, many of which have
already passed their production peak. This
decline, if occurring in a natural way –i.e.
without taking measures to curb it– has been
globally assessed at a rough yearly 9% by the
IEA. This rate has been reduced to 6.7%
thanks to a considerable scientific and tech-
nological effort requiring large ongoing
investments.
An important issue raised by the 2008 WEO
is that, as a consequence of the price forecast,
 consuming countries will see their oil bill
raise significantly. Referring to that, the IEA
points out that while global expenditure on
this item increased from 1% of global GDP in
1998 to 4% in 2007, the forecast is a rough
5% for most of the 2007-2030 period. The
only time the world spent so much on oil was
in the early 1980s, when the expenditure rate
was higher than 6%. The great beneficiaries of
this new situation will doubtless be the OPEC
countries, which will increase their benefit from
oil exports from $700 billion in 2006 to over
$2 trillion in 2030.
The 2008 WEO conclusions are so dramatic 
that the document could become a reference
for consuming countries in ultimately foster-
ing a «green New Deal» that helps them out
of the present recession, besides cutting con-
siderably their oil consumption, improving
their energy safety and reducing their
economies’ exposure to oil price volatility.
It is not about starting a conflict with produc-
ing countries. Even if consuming countries
were ultimately able to reduce their depend-
ence on oil, this source will still represent an
important part of their energy mix, especially
in transport. However, if they were able to
have oil progressively cease to be a strategic
raw material and be just one in many instead,
perhaps it would be possible to start a con-
structive dialogue between producers and
consumers related to investment and a
potential market reform and regulation, thus
reaching beneficial agreements for both sides
in the short, medium and long term.
Cooperation between producers and con-
sumers should be based on an agreement
allowing to reach maximum transparency
in the crude market. If proven reserves,
extraction flows, idle production capacity,
internal consumption and exports of any
exporting country as well as data related to
demand, consumption and stock and strategic
reserve levels in importing countries were
precisely known on the spot, it would
be relatively easy to keep the offer-demand
Change of cycle or change of model?18
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balance  permanently updated and detect
possible speculative movements distorting the
market and exacerbating volatility. Once they
were detected, such movements could then
be neutralised with adequate, strict regulations.
Nevertheless, despite some well-meant initia-
tives –such as the Joint Oil Data Initiative
 fostered by the OPEC, the IEA and four other
large international organisations– trans-
parency is, as of now, rather a desire than a
reality. Of course, not all importing countries,
especially OECD non-members, and foremost
China, live up to their truth when disclosing
required data. But the highest degree of opacity
is found in exporting countries, where the oil
industry is owned by the government or under
strong public control. 
These countries have always been reluctant to
any sort of external and independent audit on
key market data, such as the exact volume of
their proven reserves, their extraction flows,
natural decline of production in their oil fields
and the amount and implementation pace of
investments in prospect, production and infra-
structures. 
Besides, for this group of countries, most of
which are gathered in a trust like the OPEC, the
barrel price depends rather on the benefit fore-
cast written down in their government budget
than on international marginal production
costs.
Cooperation between producers 
and consumers should be based 
on an agreement allowing 
to reach maximum transparency 
in the crude market.
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Graph 5. Average crude import price by IEA
Source: IEA: World Energy Outlook, 2008
The IEA expects a strong crude price increase
in the 2007-2030 period.
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Graph 6. Blend crude price weighted mean
Source: IEA: World Energy Outlook, 2008
The blend crude price also experienced a
strong decrease in 2008.
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It is probably only when consuming countries
prove that oil is not a strategic raw material to
their economy anymore that producers will be
readier for more transparency. And this is a
sine qua non to do away with extreme volatility
in the oil markets.
Change of cycle or change of model?20
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